CHAPTER 10

POSTMODERNISM

Postmodernism is a complicated term, or set of ideas, one that has only emerged as an area of academic study since the mid-1980s. Postmodernism is hard to define, because it is a concept that appears in a wide variety of disciplines or areas of study, including art, architecture, music, film, literature, sociology, communications, fashion, and technology. It's hard to locate it temporally or historically, because it's not clear exactly when postmodernism begins.

Perhaps the easiest way to start thinking about postmodernism is by thinking about modernism, the movement from which postmodernism seems to grow or emerge. Modernism has two facets, or two modes of definition, both of which are relevant to understanding postmodernism.

The first facet or definition of modernism comes from the aesthetic movement broadly labeled 'modernism.' This movement is roughly coterminous with twentieth-century Western ideas about art (though traces of it in emergent forms can be found in the nineteenth century as well). Modernism, as you probably know, is the movement in visual arts, music, literature, and drama which rejected the old Victorian standards of how art should be made, consumed, and what it should mean. In the period of 'high modernism,' from around 1910 to 1930, the major figures of modernism literature helped radically to redefine what poetry and fiction could be and do: figures such as Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Marcel Proust, Wallace Stevens, Franz Kafka, and Rainer Maria Rilke are considered the founders of twentieth-century modernism.

From a literary perspective, the main characteristics of modernism include:

- an emphasis on impressionism and subjectivity in writing (and in visual arts as well); an emphasis on how seeing (or reading or perception itself) takes place, rather than on what is perceived. An example of this would be stream-of-consciousness writing
- a movement away from the apparent objectivity provided by omniscient third-person narrators, fixed narrative points of view, and clear-cut moral positions. Faulkner's multiply-narrated stories are an example of this aspect of modernism
- a blurring of distinctions between genres, so that poetry seems more documentary (as in T. S. Eliot or e e cummings) and prose seems more poetic (as in Woolf or Joyce)
- an emphasis on fragmented forms, discontinuous narratives, and random-seeming collages of different materials
- a tendency toward reflexivity, or self-consciousness, about the production of the work of art, so that each piece calls attention to its own status as a production, as something constructed and consumed in particular ways
- a rejection of elaborate formal aesthetics in favor of minimalist designs (as in the poetry of William Carlos Williams) and a rejection, in large part, of formal aesthetic theories, in favor of spontaneity and discovery in creation
- a rejection of the distinction between 'high' and 'low' or popular culture, both in choice of materials used to produce art and in methods of displaying, distributing, and consuming art.

Postmodernism, like modernism, follows most of these same ideas, rejecting boundaries between high and low forms of art, rejecting rigid genre distinctions, emphasizing pastiche, parody, bricolage, irony, and playfulness. Postmodern art (and thought) favors reflexivity and self-consciousness, fragmentation and discontinuity (especially in narrative structures), ambiguity, simultaneity, and an emphasis on the destructured, decentered, dehumanized subject.

But, while postmodernism seems very much like modernism in these ways, it differs from modernism in its attitude toward a lot of these trends. Modernism, for example, tends to present a fragmented view of human subjectivity and history (think of *The Wasteland*, for instance, or Woolf's *To the Lighthouse*), but presents that fragmentation as something tragic, something to be lamented and mourned as a loss. Many modernist works try to uphold the idea that works

of art can provide the unity, coherence, and meaning which has been lost in most of modern life; art will do what other human institutions fail to do. Postmodernism, in contrast, doesn't lament the idea of fragmentation, provisionality, or incoherence, but rather celebrates that. The world is meaningless? Let's not pretend that art can make meaning, then, let's just play with nonsense.

Another way of looking at the relation between modernism and postmodernism helps to clarify some of these distinctions. According to Frederic Jameson, modernism and postmodernism are cultural formations which accompany particular stages of capitalism. Jameson outlines three primary phases of capitalism which dictate particular cultural practices (including what kind of art and literature is produced). The first is market capitalism, which occurred in the eighteenth to the late nineteenth century in Western Europe, England, and the United States (and all their spheres of influence). This first phase is associated with particular technological developments, namely, the steam-driven motor, and with a particular kind of aesthetics, namely, realism. The second phase occurred from the late nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century (about the Second World War); this phase, monopoly capitalism, is associated with electric and internal combustion motors, and with modernism. The third, the phase we're in now, is multinational or consumer capitalism (with the emphasis placed on marketing, selling, and consuming commodities, not on producing them), associated with nuclear and electronic technologies, and correlated with postmodernism.

MODERNITY

Like Jameson's characterization of postmodernism in terms of the modes of production and technologies, the second facet, or definition, of postmodernism comes more from history and sociology than from literature or art history. This approach defines postmodernism as the name of an entire social formation, or set of social/historical attitudes; more precisely, this approach contrasts 'postmodernity' with 'modernity,' rather than 'postmodernism' with 'modernism.'

What's the difference? 'Modernism' generally refers to the broad aesthetic movements of the twentieth century; 'modernity' refers to a set of philosophical, political, and ethical ideas which provide the

basis for the aesthetic aspect of modernism. 'Modernity' is older than 'modernism;' the label 'modern,' first articulated in nineteenth-century sociology, was meant to distinguish the present era from the previous one, which was labeled 'antiquity.' Scholars are always debating when exactly the 'modern' period began, and how to distinguish between what is modern and what is not modern; it seems like the modern period starts earlier and earlier every time historians look at it. But generally, the 'modern' era is associated with the European Enlightenment, which begins roughly in the middle of the eighteenth century. Other historians trace elements of the Enlightenment thought back to the Renaissance or earlier. I usually date 'modern' from 1750, if only because I got my Ph.D. from a program at Stanford called 'Modern Thought and Literature,' and that program focused on works written after 1750.

The basic ideas of the Enlightenment are roughly the same as the basic ideas of humanism:[1]

- There is a stable, coherent, knowable self. This self is conscious, rational, autonomous, and universal – no physical conditions or differences substantially affect how this self operates.
- This self knows itself and the world through reason, or rationality, posited as the highest form of mental functioning, and the only objective form.
- The mode of knowing produced by the objective, rational self is 'science,' which can provide universal truths about the world, regardless of the individual status of the knower.
- The knowledge produced by science is 'truth,' and is eternal.
- The knowledge/truth produced by science (by the rational, objective, knowing self). will always lead toward progress and perfection. All human institutions and practices can be analyzed by science (reason/objectivity) and improved.
- Reason is the ultimate judge of what is true, and therefore of what is right, and what is good (what is legal and what is ethical). Freedom consists of obedience to the laws that conform to the knowledge discovered by reason.
- In a world governed by reason, the true will always be the same as the good and the right (and the beautiful); there can be no conflict between what is true and what is right (etc.).
- Science thus stands as the paradigm for any and all socially useful forms of knowledge. Science is neutral and objective; scientists,

those who produce scientific knowledge through their unbiased rational capacities, must be free to follow the laws of reason, and not be motivated by other concerns (such as money or power).

- Language, or the mode of expression used in producing and disseminating knowledge, must be rational also. To be rational, language must be transparent; it must function only to represent the real/perceivable world which the rational mind observes. There must be a firm and objective connection between the objects of perception and the words used to name them (between signifier and signified).

These are some of the fundamental premises of humanism and of modernity. They serve, as you can probably tell, to justify and explain virtually all of our social structures and institutions, including democracy, law, science, ethics, and aesthetics.

Modernity is fundamentally about order: about rationality and rationalization, creating order out of chaos. The assumption is that creating more rationality is conducive to creating more order, and that the more ordered a society is, the better it will function (the more rationally it will function). Because modernity is about the pursuit of ever-increasing levels of order, modern societies constantly are on guard against anything and everything labeled as 'disorder,' which might disrupt order. Thus modern societies rely on continually establishing a binary opposition between 'order' and 'disorder,' so that they can assert the superiority of 'order.' But to do this, they have to have things that represent 'disorder' – modern societies thus continually have to create/construct 'disorder.' In Western culture, this disorder becomes 'the other' – defined in relation to other binary oppositions. Thus anything non-white, non-male, non-heterosexual, non-hygienic, non-rational (etc.) becomes part of 'disorder,' and has to be eliminated from the ordered, rational modern society.

The ways that modern societies go about creating categories labeled as 'order' or 'disorder' have to do with the effort to achieve stability. Postmodern theorist Jean-François Lyotard equates that stability with the idea of 'totality,' or a totalized system. Totality, stability, and order, Lyotard argues, are maintained in modern societies through the means of 'grand narratives' or 'master narratives,' which are stories a culture tells itself about its practices and beliefs. A 'grand narrative' in American culture might be the story that democracy is

the most enlightened (rational) form of government, and that democracy can and will lead to universal human happiness. Every belief system or ideology has its grand narratives, according to Lyotard; for Marxism, for instance, the 'grand narrative' is the idea that capitalism will collapse in on itself and a utopian socialist world will evolve. You might think of grand narratives as a kind of meta-theory, or meta-ideology, that is, an ideology that explains an ideology (as with Marxism); a story that is told to explain the belief systems that exist.

Lyotard argues that all aspects of modern societies, including science as the primary form of knowledge, depend on these grand narratives. Postmodernism, then, is the critique of grand narratives, the awareness that such narratives serve to mask the contradictions and instabilities that are inherent in any social organization or practice. In other words, every attempt to create 'order' always demands the creation of an equal amount of 'disorder,' but a 'grand narrative' masks the constructedness of these categories by explaining that 'disorder' *really is* chaotic and bad, and that 'order' *really is* rational and good. Postmodernism, in rejecting grand narratives, favors 'mini-narratives,' stories that explain small practices, local events, rather than large-scale universal or global concepts. Postmodern 'mini-narratives' are always situational, provisional, contingent, and temporary, making no claim to universality, truth, reason, or stability.

Another aspect of Enlightenment thought is the idea that language is transparent, that words serve only as representations of thoughts or things, and don't have any function beyond that. Modern societies depend on the idea that signifiers always point to signifieds, and that reality resides in signifieds. In postmodernism, however, there are only signifiers. The idea of any stable or permanent reality disappears, and with it the idea of signifieds that signifiers point to. Rather, for postmodern societies, there are only surfaces, without depth; only signifiers, with no signifieds.

JEAN BAUDRILLARD

Jean Baudrillard, a postmodernist who studies contemporary popular culture, says that commodities – the stuff you buy – are all signifiers. You buy stuff not necessarily because you will use it, or because it gives you pleasure, but because the stuff means something beyond itself – it is a signifier that points to a signified. That signified,

according to Baudrillard, is social status, or a subject position within a variety of social codes or models. Thus when you buy a car, you don't buy just any car to drive around in (which would be buying a commodity largely for use value); the car you buy is a signifier of your social position, your income level, your recreational habits, your political/environmental views, whether you have children, etc. So someone who buys a Mercedes is signifying something different from those who buy minivans or SUVs or hybrid gas/electric cars. What is being signified is in fact your position(s) as a subject; according to Baudrillard, identity (subjecthood) is thus a product of the signifiers with which one surrounds oneself, rather than something essential that is unique to each individual, as in the humanist model. Selfhood, for Baudrillard, as for Lacan, is thus always already an alienated position, something defined by externals.

Baudrillard takes this idea of the signifier–signified relationship further in discussing one of his best-known ideas, the concept of the *simulacrum*. He starts with the idea that the signifier–signified relationship is a relationship of a symbol to a notion of 'reality' – signifiers are representations (words, pictures, symbols, whatever) that point to something beyond or outside of themselves, something which supposedly has a reality of its own, regardless of how it is represented. A chair, for instance, just is, whether we designate it by the word 'chair' or by some other signifier; the object with four legs and a seat continues to exist no matter what we call it, or even whether we call it anything. In the world of mass media which Baudrillard studies, however, there is no signified, no reality, no level of simple existence to which signifiers refer. Rather, Baudrillard says, there are only signifiers with no signifieds; there are only pictures of chairs without any real chairs ever being referred to or existing. He calls this separation of signifier from signified a 'simulacrum,' a representation without an original that it copies. Simulacra (the plural of simulacrum) don't mirror or reproduce or imitate or copy reality: they *are* reality itself, says Baudrillard.

In Western thought since Plato, Baudrillard points out, the idea of an original or real thing has always been favored over the idea of an imitation or a copy. This is particularly evident in the arts, where an original painting, or a first edition, is worth a lot of money, while a reproduction (a print, a second or eighteenth edition) is worth very little. In the postmodern world of mass media, however, the original largely disappears, and only copies exist. An example of this is music

CDs: there is no 'original' master version of any music CD, but only thousands and thousands of copies, all identical, all equal in value. Think also about xerox copies: when I make a hundred copies of this typed page, I have an 'original,' but there's no difference between my original and any of the copies – so the 'original' page that came out of my printer is no different from any of the copies that came out of the copier. Mass-mediated forms of communication in postmodern culture revolve around this idea of simulacra, of imitations and copies with no original. This is why Andy Warhol, and his mass produced images of Campbell's soup cans and Marilyn Monroe, is often classified as a postmodern artist.

Simulacra, as signifiers with no signifieds, produce what we know as 'reality,' according to Baudrillard; mass media disseminate these simulacra everywhere, constantly, so that they are unavoidable and inescapable. The simulacra forever being projected at viewers by the mass media provide what Baudrillard calls 'codes' or 'models' which tell us (viewers, consumers) what and how to think, act, believe, buy, desire, hate, etc. Humans in postmodern culture occupy passive subject positions within these codes or models; this idea is similar to Althusser's notion of how ideologies interpellate subjects, but Baudrillard is not following either structuralist or Marxist 'grand narratives' in formulating his theories.

A simulacrum creates a passive subject who takes the simulation as the only necessary reality; a kid playing a race-car video game who then gets behind the wheel of a 'real' car may not be able to tell the difference between the two experiences of 'driving.' The lack of distinction between game and reality is another feature of postmodern culture, one which is illustrated in a host of movies, starting with *War Games* (1983), where a computer simulation of nuclear war threatens to start a real nuclear war, and including all the installments of the movie *The Matrix*. Another example of the collapse between image and reality can be found in such pop figures as Madonna and Michael Jackson, who exist as all image, all 'surface,' all signifier. A humanist investigation of either of these two people would look for the 'real person' behind the glitzy image; a postmodern investigation of Madonna and Michael Jackson would assume that there was no 'real person' behind the image, and that the image itself was all that mattered.

When the image is more 'real' than any other 'reality,' where there is only surface but no depth, only signifiers with no signifieds, only

imitations with no originals, Baudrillard says, we are in the realm of *hyperreality*. One of the best examples of such a hyperreality is Disneyland, which is a minutely created 'reality' of things that don't exist in the modern version of the 'real world.' For postmodern theorists, the hyperreality of the created worlds becomes more 'real' than the real world, and in fact highlights how what we have always thought of as the 'real world' is itself a constructed hyperreality.

My favorite example of this is the movie *Wag the Dog*, subtitled 'A comedy about truth, justice, and other special effects.' The movie tells a story about a president who is caught in a sexually compromising situation with a girl scout. To keep this story from being the headline news for the next number of months, the president hires a Hollywood producer to film a 'war' with Albania, and to broadcast that on the evening news as if it were really happening. 'Truth' thus becomes a 'special effect,' something created by visual images in film and on TV; what is on the screen is truer, more real, than what is 'really' happening off camera, and the (passive) viewing public takes it as such. What's funny in the movie, though, is what Baudrillard and other postmodern theorists say is happening all the time. Whenever you watch the news on TV, how do you know that the film clips you're seeing represent something that's 'really' happening, and are not just produced like a sit-com or made-for-TV movie? Baudrillard and others would say you can't know, and in fact there can be no difference between 'reality' and its representation: what's on TV is what is 'real,' is the only reality we can know.

In addition to its focus on the social constructions of 'reality,' postmodernist theory also examines questions of the organization of knowledge. In modern societies, knowledge was equated with science, and was contrasted to narrative; science was good knowledge, and narrative was bad, primitive, irrational (and thus associated with women, children, primitives, and insane people). Knowledge, however, was good for its own sake; one gained knowledge, via education, in order to be knowledgeable in general, to become an educated person. This is the ideal of the liberal arts education. In a postmodern society, however, knowledge becomes functional – you learn things, not to know them, but to use that knowledge. Educational policy today puts emphasis on skills and training, rather than on a vague humanist ideal of education in general.

Not only is knowledge in postmodern societies characterized by its utility, but knowledge is also distributed, stored, and arranged

differently in postmodern societies than in modern ones. Specifically, the advent of electronic computer technologies has revolutionized the modes of knowledge production, distribution, and consumption in our society (indeed, some might argue that postmodernism is best described by, and correlated with, the emergence of computer technology, starting in the 1960s, as the dominant force in all aspects of social life). In postmodern societies, anything which is not able to be translated into a form recognizable and storable by a computer – i.e. anything that's not digitizable – will cease to be knowledge. In this paradigm, the opposite of 'knowledge' is not 'ignorance,' as it is the modern/humanist paradigm, but rather 'noise.' Anything that doesn't qualify as a kind of knowledge is 'noise,' is something that is not recognizable as anything within this system.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD

Lyotard says that the important question for postmodern societies is who decides what knowledge is (and what 'noise' is), and who knows what needs to be decided. Such decisions about knowledge don't involve the old modern/humanist standards, such as the ability to assess knowledge as truth (its technical quality), or as goodness or justice (its ethical quality) or as beauty (its aesthetic quality). Rather, Lyotard argues, knowledge follows the paradigm of a language game.

Lyotard argues that knowledge can take two forms: it can be 'science' or 'narrative.' He associates both with ideas about 'language games' from the linguistic philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein. A 'language game,' in brief, is any linguistic act (statement, utterance, sentence, etc.). He calls it a 'game' because each linguistic act follows certain rules and uses certain strategies; you might think here about Bakhtin's ideas about heteroglossia, and the different kinds of languages you use in the course of a day in talking to different audiences about different topics and for different purposes. Lyotard talks about 'narrative' as a language game that doesn't need any outside legitimation: when you tell a story, the story simply exists on its own, and you don't need to prove it or footnote it or assert that it's true. We saw a version of this with Foucault's discussion of 'the author function;' he pointed out that authors become necessary when stories do need to be legitimated, when you have to attribute the story to someone who made it up. Some stories, like legends or folk-tales, don't ever need authors; other stories – which

are more linked to 'science' than to 'narrative' – do. Lyotard says that no narrative needs legitimation, by definition; if something needs to have an authority behind it to insist that it's true, then it's defined as 'science.' But, Lyotard says, 'science' can never legitimize itself; it always has to refer to narrative (or a narrative) as the authority outside itself that guarantees its truth.

More specifically, according to Lyotard, science depends on what he calls 'grand narratives' – he refers to the grand narratives of the Enlightenment enthronement of reason and Hegel's narrative of the unity of all knowledge. Such grand narratives, or metanarratives, serve as the basis for most forms of knowledge in modern Western culture. The structuralists, for instance, believed in a grand narrative in their attempts to find universal structures in language, in social relations and families, and in myth, which would explain all human behavior at all times everywhere. Such a search for the universal 'truth' is common to both the humanist project and the structuralist project; both depend on the metanarrative that there is something that all humans at all times everywhere have in common, and that it is possible (and desirable) to discover what that commonality consists of. Similarly, the grand narrative of psychoanalysis lies in the premise that the Oedipus Complex, and its related phenomena, are universal, and can explain all human behavior at all times everywhere; the grand narrative of Marxism lies in the premise that material conditions create relations of production, which then determine human behavior at all times everywhere. For Marxists, however, these relations of production which determine human behavior will differ over time and place, as modes of production shift; what is universal in this grand narrative is the idea that modes and relations of production – whatever those might be – determine all aspects of human behavior.

Lyotard's postmodern perspective shows the flaws in these grand narratives, which work to justify and support the broad theories, like structuralism, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, through which the modern (Western) world has come to understand and represent itself. In place of these grand narratives, postmodern theorists like Lyotard propose sets of 'micronarratives' – small stories, small theories, which might explain a certain set of phenomena, but which don't make any claims to universal 'truth.' Such micronarratives would have use value; they could arise from and be applied to specific situations, but none would claim to explain everything, or to explain all other theories, or to be the preferred or dominant

framework through which any event could be understood. Postmodern micronarratives thus are multiple – there is one for every situation, rather than one narrative covering all situations – and they are necessarily different and largely incompatible; there's no way to put all the micronarratives together to form one unified coherent idea of how the world, or human beings, operate.

In this sense, postmodernism seems to offer some alternatives to joining the global culture of consumption, where commodities and forms of knowledge are offered by forces far beyond any individual's control. These alternatives focus on thinking of any and all action (or social struggle) as necessarily local, limited, and partial – but nonetheless effective. By discarding 'grand narratives' (like the liberation of the entire working class) and focusing on specific local goals (such as improved day care centers for working parents in your own community), postmodernist politics offers a way to theorize local situations as fluid and unpredictable, though influenced by global trends. Hence the motto for postmodern politics might well be 'think globally, act locally' – and don't worry about any grand scheme or master plan.

There are lots of questions to be asked about postmodernism, and one of the most important is about the politics involved – or, more simply, whether this movement toward fragmentation, provisionality, performance, and instability is something good or something bad? There are various answers to that; in our contemporary society, however, the desire to return to the pre-postmodern era (modern/humanist/Enlightenment thinking) tends to be associated with conservative political, religious, and philosophical groups. In fact, one of the consequences of postmodernism seems to be the rise of religious fundamentalism, as a form of resistance to the questioning of the 'grand narratives' of religious truth. An example of this would be any religious group which censors or bans literary works which question or deconstruct the grand narrative on which fundamentalist religious beliefs depend; we see this in the Muslim fundamentalist ban on Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, and in Christian fundamentalist protests against books like J. K. Rowling's *Harry Potter* series.

GILLES DELEUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI

A sub-heading no transition (since transitions imply an overall order, a grand narrative that governs the shape of a piece of speech

or writing, and gives it coherence and unity) Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are the authors of a number of rather difficult works explaining postmodern ideas, including *Anti-Oedipus*, which (as you might guess) deconstructs and reworks Freud's ideas about the formation of the self and the psyche and the unconscious. In the essay 'A Thousand Plateaus,' taken from their book of the same title, they present the concept of the *rhizome* as a basic structure in the postmodern world.

Deleuze and Guattari start by talking about the idea of 'arborescence,' or the model of the tree as the predominating model for how knowledge operates in the Enlightenment/modern Western world. In this model, a small idea – a seed or acorn – takes root and sends up shoots; these shoots become a sturdy trunk, supported by the invisible but powerful root system, which feeds the tree; from this unified strong trunk come lots of branches and leaves. Everything that is the tree is traceable back to a single point of origin; everything that is the tree is part of a coherent organic system which has grown vertically, progressively, and steadily. This, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is how all humanist/Enlightenment/Western thought has worked, and how all art and literature from that humanist culture has operated.

They want to throw out the model of the tree and replace it with a model of fungus, a *rhizome*. A rhizome is an organism which consists of interconnected living fibers, but with no central point, no particular origin, no definitive structure, no formative unity. A rhizome doesn't start from anywhere or end anywhere; at every point in its existence it is the same, a network of individual but indistinguishable threads. A rhizome is much harder to uproot; an example is crabgrass, which continues to survive no matter how much of it you pull up, since no part is the 'governing' part of the organism.

Another good example of a rhizomatic structure is the Internet, the World Wide Web. Unlike a spider's web, the World Wide Web has no center; there's no place that starts it, controls it, monitors it, or ends it. Rather, the Web is just the interconnection of all the zillions of websites that exist – and which exist only in hyperreality, only in digital form, only as images on a computer screen, and not in any material form. Take any individual website out and the Web still exists, without any impairment of functioning; take out Yahoo and Google and maybe even Microsoft, and the Web will still exist and will still work the same way.

Deleuze and Guattari argue that stories, narratives, literature operate like either a tree structure or a root structure. 'Tree' stories have a beginning, a middle, and an end; they have a linear progression, and tell a story about growth, about achievement, about upwardness. Tree narratives, they say, make the statement 'to be,' continually talking about what is, what becomes, what will be, and what was. Rhizome stories, narratives, literature, on the other hand (or limb) don't have these delimited starting and ending points. They are about a maze of surface connections, rather than about depth and height; they make the statement 'and . . . and . . . and . . .' rather than 'to be,' as they show connections between events and people and ideas without necessarily offering any causative explanations or direction for those connections. Rhizomatic narratives offer what Deleuze and Guattari call 'lines of flight' and 'strategies of deterritorialization,' rather than maps of a territory or terrain.

So. No ending, no conclusion. The writing just s t o p s

NOTE

1 This list is modeled after a similar list in an article by Jane Flax, 'Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory,' in Linda J. Nicholson, ed., *Feminism/Postmodernism*. New York and London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 41–2.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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